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The Products Liability Restatement Warning 
Obligations: History, Corrective Justice and Efficiency 
M. Stuart Madden 
Because a substantial amount of time is to 
be devoted to the design defect aspects of the 
new Restatement, I wanted to talk to you about 
warnings defects. I will address the subject 
from four perspectives. I will first speak about 
the dominant theories of warnings decisional 
law under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
and follow that description with my reading of 
the placed upon gloss on those themes by the 
Third Restatement. My goal is to evaluate 
whether or not the Third Restatement retards or 
advances what have been the two dominant 
themes in torts jurisprudence for the recent 
past: corrective justice and efficiency. Lastly, 
I wish to give a prognosis as to the acceptance 
of the Products Liability warnings provisions in 
the judicial marketplace. 
Independently of a manufacturer's design 
or manufacturing processes, a product seller 
may be found liable if a product characteristic 
is the legal cause of injury or loss, and the prod- 
uct is unaccompanied by warnings adequate to 
make the product duly safe for its ordinarily 
foreseeable use, including reasonably foresee- 
able misuse. These two informational obliga- 
tions associated with product sales, that of pro- 
viding warnings and providing instructions, 
derive from two policy objectives: (1) risk 
reduction and reduction of accident costs; and 
(2) informed consent. Warnings as to product 
hazards and instructions for reasonably safe use 
are established mechanisms for risk reduction 
as they obligate manufacturers to produce prod- 
ucts that achieve optimal levels of safety. An 
optimal level of safety does not mean maxi- 
mum or a total safety. The informed consent, or 
informed judgment rationale, reflects a societal 
assessment that a product user or consumer is 
entitled to make his own choice as to whether 
or not a product's utility or benefits justify 
exposing himself to the risk of harm. 
The widely followed approach for many 
years has been for litigants to pursue claims 
under both doctrinal categories (negligence, 
strict liability and warranty) as well as func- 
tional categories (manufacturing defect, design 
defect and warning defect). As you know, the 
new Restatement adopts the functional 
approach. But be the approach functional or 
doctrinal, under any theory of liability, a warn- 
ing, if found to be necessary, must by its size 
and location and intensity of language, be cal- 
culated to impress upon the reasonably prudent 
user of the product the nature and extent of the 
hazard involved. The language must be direct 
and should where applicable describe methods 
of safe use, and it must advise of significant 
hazards from reasonably foreseeable misuse. 
Historically, a manufacturer is not required 
to give warnings regarding risks that should be 
obvious to the ordinary user. The position 
taken in the decisions comprising this body of 
law as stated by one court is in this language: 
"[a] manufacturer cannot manufacture a knife 
that will not cut, or a hammer that will not mash 
a thumb, or a stove that will not bum a finger. 
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The law does not require him to warn of such 
common dangers."' 
When products are sold in bulk to an inter- 
mediary for subsequent use by others, the sell- 
er discharges his duty to warn when it can be 
concluded reasonably that the intermediary is 
in a superior position to warn ultimate users, 
and when the bulk seller can rely reasonably 
upon the intermediary to utilize that superior 
position to do so. 
What is the gloss to or amplification of 
existing warnings law that the Third 
Restatement affects? I won't describe to you 
what the Restatement provision is, as you have 
it in your materials. But I have selected a sub- 
set of warnings issues to illustrate the new 
Restatement 's substantial fidelity to the deci- 
sional law interpreted by the Second 
Restatement. 
The warning duties tied foreseeable haz- 
ards, together with the accompanying 
Comments and Reporters' Notes, make it clear 
that a seller's warning obligation is triggered 
only by hazards that are known or knowable at 
the time the product was initially introduced 
into commerce. This is a nearly universal rule, 
and it's the appropriate rule for the new 
Restatement. 
The Products Liability Restatement's 
preservation of the open and obvious rule is 
supported by the position taken in a majority of 
jurisdictions that there is just no duty to warn of 
obvious risks. The rationale for not requiring 
warnings in such instances is stated in comment 
j to section 2 which states: "When a risk is 
obvious or generally known, the prospective 
addressee of the warning will or should already 
know of its existence. Warning of an obvious 
or generally known risk in most instances will 
not provide an effective additional measure of 
~afety."~ Thus, in adopting this rule, the 
Institute has made no significant sacrifice in the 
tort goals of personal autonomy and reducing 
preventable accidents. As importantly, the 
reporters have recognized the social cost of 
overwarning as described by Henderson and 
Twerski in this language: "Bombarded with 
nearly useless warnings about risks that rarely 
materialize in harm, many consumers could be 
expected to give up on warnings a~together."~ 
Regarding warnings to intermediaries, the 
Restatement, comment i, emphasizes the 
Restatement's interest in lowering accident 
costs, while recognizing that it is ordinarily the 
workplace supervisor who can most effectively 
and efficiently communicate hazard informa- 
tion. This position tracks, albeit more succinct- 
ly, comment n to Restatement (Second) of Torts 
$388. 
What of the efficiency goals and correc- 
tive justice objectives of tort law? I wish at this 
point to glimpse at the sometimes substantive 
but more often nominal distinctions between 
the two tort camps, as Gary Schwartz at one 
point has written, both vying for the torts flag.4 
These two schools comprise (1) those who say 
that tort goals are properly vindicated through a 
corrective justice model, and (2) those who 
counter that wealth maximization and eflicien- 
cy are the pursuits that should be advanced with 
ardor. 
In my view the new Restatement's treat- 
ment of warnings fares well under both correc- 
tive justice and efficiency principles. Viewed 
in terms of the personal autonomy component 
of corrective justice, the informed consent 
rationale was put forth by the Fifth Circuit in 
Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Products ~ o r p ?  
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when the court stated that "a duty to warn 
attaches whenever a reasonable man would 
want to be informed of the risk in order to 
decide whether to expose himself to it."6 
From an efficiency perspective, one of the 
efficiency approach's most noteworthy con- 
structs has been to espouse a tort doctrine that 
will deter persons from engaging in activities 
that a reasonable person would view ahead of 
time to be socially wasteful. Transferred to a 
products liability context, what if the seller of a 
product without adequate warning causes per- 
sonal physical injury or property damage? A 
seller of a product with a high risk level bar- 
gains for the right to sell it, which is to say, pre- 
serves the transaction within the market, by 
conveying warnings sufficient to convey to 
buyers or users information sufficient to make 
an informed choice of whether or not to expose 
themselves to the risk. Absent that bargain 
struck, absent that informed judgment, a defec- 
tive product that causes injury represents an 
involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from 
the injured party to the injurer. The wasteful- 
ness, of course, cannot be gainsaid. It leads 
directly to the type of litigation with which you 
are all familiar. 
In the main, the Products Liability 
Restatement k treatment of warnings to inter- 
mediaries can be harmonized readily with both 
Posner's market efficiency7 and Calabresi's 
least cost avoide? approaches. Under the lat- 
ter, the least cost avoider approach, a manufac- 
turer will ordinarily be the least cost avoider in 
that it, rather than the purchaser or the interme- 
diate seller, is presumed to be an expert in all of 
the risk potential of the product and therefore 
will be in a better position than the user or con- 
sumer to know and, as appropriate, most inex- 
pensively remediate the hazard. Illustrative of 
this case is one called Beauchamp x  uss sell,^ 
which involved the issue of the relation, if any, 
between an air valve component in a pneumat- 
ically-run palletizer and the injury of the plain- 
tiffs spouse. The court therein suggested that 
the duty to warn should properly be placed 
upon the marketing participant with the greatest 
access to the information and the easiest of its 
dissemination; in this case, the component part 
manufacturer. lo 
As regards obvious risks, the general rule 
that there is no such duty can be validated in 
terms of efficiency as the new Restatement 
endorses avoidance of unnecessary transaction 
costs to the marketing of useful products. The 
Products Liability Restatement also retains an 
efficient rule that would relieve the component 
or ingredient supplier of liability when the 
component or ingredient is not itself defective. 
In such circumstances the component or ingre- 
dient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful 
control over the hazard level of the finished 
product. 
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